Comparison of Tagging Technologies for Safeguards of Copper Canisters for Nuclear Spent Fuel by Clementi, Chiara et al.
sensors
Review
Comparison of Tagging Technologies for Safeguards
of Copper Canisters for Nuclear Spent Fuel
Chiara Clementi 1,2, François Littmann 1,* and Lorenzo Capineri 2 ID
1 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, I-21027 Ispra, Italy; chiara.clementi@ec.europa.eu
2 Department of Information Engineering, University of Florence, 50139 Florence, Italy;
lorenzo.capineri@unifi.it
* Correspondence: francois.littmann@ec.europa.eu; Tel.: +39-033-278-6230
Received: 30 January 2018; Accepted: 7 March 2018; Published: 21 March 2018


Abstract: Several countries are planning to store nuclear spent fuel in long term geological
repositories, preserved by copper canisters with an iron insert. This new approach involves many
challenging problems and one is to satisfy safeguards requirements: the Continuity of Knowledge
(CoK) of the fuel must be kept from the encapsulation plant up to the final repository. To date,
no measurement system has been suggested for a unique identification and authentication. Following
the list of the most important safeguards, safety and security requirements for copper canisters
identification and authentication, a review of conventional tagging technologies and measurement
systems for nuclear items is reported in this paper. The aim of this study is to verify to what extent
each technology could be potentially used for keeping the CoK of copper canisters. Several tagging
methods are briefly described and compared, discussing advantages and disadvantages.
Keywords: identification tags; nuclear spent fuel; copper canisters
1. Introduction
The spent fuel generated from the operation of nuclear reactors is still highly radioactive and
will continue to generate high heat levels for years. Therefore, after removal from the reactor core,
the fuel needs to be safely managed in two alternative ways: reprocessing (when the fuel is seen as a
potential future energy resource) or the direct storage (when the fuel is considered a waste). Either
management options will involve a number of steps, which will necessarily include storage of the
spent fuel for some period of time. Storage options include wet storage, in some form of storage
pool, or dry storage, in a facility or storage casks built for this purpose. Over the years a number of
different designs for both wet and dry storage have been developed and used in different countries [1].
However, the need to keep long-lived radioactive wastes (including spent nuclear fuel) contained
and isolated from humans and the environment for a very long time, has led to the idea of long term
disposal in underground repositories. The ‘multi-barrier’ concept provides isolation by a combination
of engineered and natural barriers (rock, salt, clay) and no obligation to actively maintain the facility is
passed on to future generations. Several countries have already invested many years and resources
toward implementing final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository [2]. Among them,
Sweden is one of the countries in which this process is most advanced. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel
and Waste Management Co. (SKB) developed the method for the final disposal of the spent nuclear
fuel at a depth of about 500 m underground in Swedish bedrock. The fuel will be placed in canisters
with an external shell made of copper and an insert of cast iron (Figure 1). These canisters will be
surrounded by a special kind of bentonite clay that swells when it comes in contact with groundwater.
Copper endures the anoxic conditions in the deep bedrock and the initially 50 mm thickness of the
copper shell ensures that the waste will be safely contained for the time required [3–5]. The entire
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storage will ultimately be filled with bentonite clay, keeping the fuel isolated from human beings and
the environment.
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ponds for several decades (up to 40 years). During this time, the thermal and ionizing radiation 
decreases significantly. Later, storage canisters with spent fuel will be lifted from the pools and 
moved to the encapsulation plant where the fuel is inserted in copper canisters with iron inserts. 
After encapsulation, the canisters are transported to the final repository and then located in the 
deposition hole. About 6000 copper canisters will be deposited, with an average of one canister per 
day [7]. 
During transport and deposition of canisters, from the encapsulation plant to the final 
repository, it is extremely important to identify uniquely each container in order to guarantee the 
Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of spent nuclear fuel. CoK is defined as, the outcome of ‘a system of 
data or information regarding an item or activity that is uninterrupted and authentic and provides 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM)with adequate insight to draw conclusions that nuclear material is not being diverted 
from peaceful purposes’ [8]. Maintaining the CoK of spent nuclear fuel throughout its life cycle 
means then deploying the most robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures [9]. 
Concerning copper canisters, the IAEA safeguards approaches propose to use canister 
identification to support the CoK. SKB has to date not presented any method for labelling the copper 
canisters [7]. An external engraving or marking of the canister should be avoided because it may 
impede the long term safety and integrity of the container since it may trigger a corrosion process. In 
fact, according to the mechanical design requirements [10], the minimum copper thickness must not 
be less than 50 mm. Therefore, alternative tagging solutions must be implemented. Labelling devices 
must be tamper indicating by a unique identity (identification) and must be able to give evidence of 
counterfeiting or duplication (authentication). The identification of a canister is the process of clearly 
distinguishing that canister from the others. The authentication, instead, is the action of proving the 
originality of a certain canister. The most common technologies for identification and authentication 
of nuclear items are described in this paper. The aim of this review is making a comparison between 
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The final repository shall be designed so that it does not require maintenance or supervision.
The reason for this is that there is no way to guarantee supervision and maintenance over a period
of time lasting perhaps many thousands of years [6]. The SKB’s method for final disposal of fuel
comprises a number of facilities that together provide a safe chain (Figure 2). The fuel coming from
Swedish reactors is stored for one year minimum in the spent fuel ponds at the reactors, before it is
shipped to the interim storage facility. There, the fuel is placed in storage baskets which are stored
in ponds for several decades (up to 40 years). During this time, the thermal and ionizing radiation
decreases significantly. Later, storage canisters with spent fuel will be lifted from the pools and moved
to the encapsulation plant where the fuel is inserted in copper canisters with iron inserts. After
encapsulation, the canisters are transported to the final repository and then located in the deposition
hole. About 6000 copper canisters will be deposited, with an average of one canister per day [7].
During transport and deposition of canisters, from the encapsulation plant to the final repository,
it is extremely important to identify uniquely each container in order to guarantee the Continuity
of Knowledge (CoK) of spent nuclear fuel. CoK is defined as, the outcome of ‘a system of data
or information regarding an item or activity that is uninterrupted and authentic and provides
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM)with adequate insight to draw conclusions that nuclear material is not being diverted
from peaceful purposes’ [8]. Maintaining the CoK of spent nuclear fuel throughout its life cycle means
then deploying the most robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures [9].
Concerning copper canisters, the IAEA safeguards approaches propose to use canister
identification to support the CoK. SKB has to date not presented any method for labelling the copper
canisters [7]. An external engraving or marking of the canister should be avoided because it may
impede the long term safety and integrity of the container since it may trigger a corrosion process.
In fact, according to the mechanical design requirements [10], the minimum copper thickness must not
be less than 50 mm. Therefore, alternative tagging solutions must be implemented. Labelling devices
must be tamper indicating by a unique identity (identification) and must be able to give evidence of
counterfeiting or duplication (authentication). The identification of a canister is the process of clearly
distinguishing that canister from the others. The authentication, instead, is the action of proving the
originality of a certain canister. The most common technologies for identification and authentication of
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nuclear items are described in this paper. The aim of this review is making a comparison between the
different approaches, analyzing advantages and disadvantages with a view to find which techniques
could be better fitting to copper canisters identification and authentication. The first part of the paper
describes the most significant safeguards requirements for long term storage of nuclear spent fuel in
geological repositories. Afterwards, next paragraphs give an overview of the existing technologies used
for tagging of nuclear items, among which seals, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), SERS-Active
Nanoparticle Aggregates, Tungsten-based identifier, reflective laser scanning, reflective particle tag
(RPT), and ultrasounds. In the end, a potential application of these technologies for copper canisters
identification and authentication is discussed and results are summarized in a table. The greater part
of the data collected in this paper comes from the private database of the JRC, scientific articles, nuclear
authorities’ reports and companies’ websites.
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2. Safeguards Requirements for Geological Repositories
The IAEA and the EURATOM Safeguards approaches for encapsulation plants and geological
repositories are based on integrated safeguards. The idea of integration can be resumed with the
“3S concept” that shows the relationship between Safety, Security and Safeguards [11]. Figure 3 gives a
graphic representation of the 3S concept.
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Repositories present several new challenges for international safeguards. Indeed, deep geological
repositories will be unique among nuclear facilities. Being located entirely underground, a repository
is never visible in its entirety, but can only be inspected through the use of underground mapping
techniques and remote sensing methods (most commonly geophysical methods, including seismic and
acoustic monitoring, ground-penetrating radar, etc.). Furthermore, unlike other nuclear facilities, the
construction of additional emplacement tunnels will continue when emplacement operations will be
already started. This makes inspection of a completed facility prior to operation impossible, and may
add to potential difficulties with simultaneously monitoring both construction and emplacement
activities, as well as with verifying design information. Another potential complicating factor is that
potential changes of the design may occur when unanticipated underground conditions (e.g., faults,
fractures, etc.) are encountered during construction, necessitating a change in design. Such potential for
design changes during construction (and potentially during operations as well) further complicate the
ability to verify design information. No other nuclear facility presents such difficulties. The principal
safeguards challenges associated with both geological repositories and spent-fuel encapsulation plants
include [12]:
• Verification of spent fuel at encapsulation plant prior to transport and emplacement.
• Assuring that the waste/spent fuel is emplaced as declared.
• Assuring that no waste/spent fuel is diverted before or after emplacement, including by
excavating a closed and sealed repository.
• Detecting such diversion or attempts in a timely manner.
• Maintaining continuity of knowledge about waste/spent fuel destined for disposal and after disposal.
•
, .
• lying effective contain ent an s rveillance ( S) easures to canisters and to the entire
repository (the latter oul be acco plishe through re ote sensing via geophysical etho s,
aerial and satellite i agery, etc.).
Regarding copper canisters, the IAEA and EURATOM inspectors may have the need to verify the
identity of a filled spent fuel canister, before or after disposal. Therefore a system for the identification
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and authentication of copper canisters is required. In general, a tag consists of a pattern that can
be used to identify or count specific items. In the nuclear field, tags must be well shielded against
radiations and robust against duplication or counterfeiting. The main important requirements for a
copper canister tagging systems are [13]:
• Large and unique tag memory.
• Security against falsification of data, errors/multiple verification.
• Environmental safety (avoid corrosion effects of e.g., copper canisters).
• Non-contact and portable/compact reader system (preferably).
• Long operation time (100 years or longer).
• Resistance to harsh environment (high radiation, temperature and humidity).
• Cost-effectiveness.
• Easy implementation and use (do not affect too much the production chain of copper canisters).
• Minimal human input (the presence of inspectors should be minimal; systems should acquire,
save and transfer data automatically to inspectors’ headquarters).
Traditional tags (engraved, etched, attached, welded) are simple and practical, but may not
constitute a unique identifier which could be verified by the IAEA and EURATOM. Moreover any
modification to the outside of the canister may pose a risk to its long-term integrity and so must be
carefully considered [14]. In fact, application of external markings may be restricted if such markings
could cause corrosion or otherwise affect the integrity of the canister. Without external markings,
all disposal canisters will be visually identical. Once emplaced and backfilled, canisters will be
neither accessible nor visible. Even if recovered from emplacement, these canisters may be largely
indistinguishable due to surface corrosion of any distinguishing external markings or other features.
Furthermore a surface treatment often is susceptible to unintentional damage during normal handling,
rendering them unusable.
While it is important to be able to identify individual canisters, it is also necessary to know that a
canister had not been opened and any contents removed or exchanged. The copper canister external
surface is not inherently tamper-indicating. The development of a suitable instrument to identify and
authenticate copper canisters is still a challenge for the inspectorates. For this purpose, in the next
chapters the main features of conventional tagging technologies will be briefly described, analyzing
their relevance for the identification of copper canisters for long term storage of nuclear spent fuel.
3. Seals
One of the oldest tagging systems for nuclear waste is the seal [15]. Seals are typically used to
provide a unique identity to containers for nuclear items. The integrity of the seal can be verified over
time in order to detect potential tampering attempts. The verification of a seal can be implemented
with or without removing the seal from the container by checking the identity and integrity. Seals do
not provide a physical protection to the sealed item but just give evidence of possible manipulations.
Seals can be passive, that do not require any energy source or active, that require power to operate, like
for example (Electronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS), Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA)
and Active Optical Loop Seal (AOLS)).
3.1. Passive Sealing Systems
Passive sealing systems are very used by of the IAEA. A passive seal requires visual inspection
and does not provide real-time monitoring capabilities. The most common passive seals are metal
seals, adhesive seals, COBRA seals and ultrasonic seals (UOSB, USSB).
Metal seals (CAPS) are simple and inexpensive. The seal consists of two metallic halves (caps),
which can be interlocked. A piece of wire is used to attach the seal; the ends of the wire are tied inside
the seal before closing it therefore the loop cannot be opened without cutting (Figure 4). Random
scratches and solder smears on the inner surface of the metal cap realize a unique identity. The seal is
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designed in such a way that any attempt to open it would be detectable. Moreover the verification
of the seal must be performed at the IAEA and EURATOM’s headquarters by comparing the images
before installation and after removal. New developments aim in-situ verification by the use of the laser
surface authentication method (to create a unique physical signature on the top and bottom halves of
the metal seal) and the eddy current verification (to verify the wire integrity) [16]. In 2011 the IAEA
began the development of a new frangible seal as a replacement for the CAPS seals. It is a two-part
glass seal with random colored patterns throughout the seal body. Upon a tamper attempt, the seal
body will break. The intent is that such seals can be verified in-situ for indications of tampering and
for authentication.
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Figure 4. Metal cap seal.
The adhesive seal is realized with a special material which release evidence of the detachment.
Therefore this seal is intended only for temporary applications and its main advantages is the low
price and the low operation, logistics and maintenance train.
The COBRA seal is composed by a fiber-optic loop that is enclosed in a seal and cut in a random
way creating a unique pattern. After the seal installation, a reference image of the seal’s pattern is
recorded. In such a way, during the verification of the seal, it is possible to compare the reference
image with the new pattern recorded to detect potential changes [17].
The Ultrasonic Optical Sealing Bolt (UOSB) and Ultrasonic Sealing System Bolt (USSB) are instead
stainless steel seals that involve ultrasounds for the detection of a unique fingerprint. The USSB is
used primarily for underwater applications while UOSB are applied on dry storage casks. The USSB
is realized by a unique random pattern of metal discs (identity) and a frangible element (integrity)
that breaks if the seal is removed from the container (Figure 5). By the ultrasonic reading of the seal,
the unique pattern realized by discs and the frangible element can be detected. Patterns recorded
during installation are compared with those obtained during subsequent in situ checks to verify any
tampering attempts [18,19].
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3.2. Active sealing Systems
The El ctronic Optical Sealing System (EOSS) developed by Neumann Elecktronik GmbH is an
electronic seal with a fi er-optic loop which rovides evidence of opening of the se l once applied on a
cask (F gure 6). The reader is re lized by a laser sourc tha verifies the integrity of the fiber-optic loop
ver time. T seal is reusable and high reliable thanks to the “smart” power management system.
Moreover the EOSS can be remotely interrogated and provide information about status, event log,
and inspection data [16,20].
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The Remotely Monitored Sealing Array (RMSA) is developed by Mirion Technologies (Canberra)
and is used for the identification of a large amount of nuclear items. The RMSA is composed by a
network of electronic optical seals and a data translator to acquire data from the array. Based upon
the Secure Sensor Platform (SSP) technology, the RMSA stores, forwards and communicates data by
using a customized data communication protocol over a no-license, low-power radiofrequency link.
The data can be stored and transferred remotely and securely (authenticated and encrypted) to the
data translator that collects data from all the RMSA seals in a particular location. The seal itself is a
reusable device with an expected lifespan of four to five years [21].
The Active Optical Loop Seal (AOLS) developed by the Joint Research Centre of the European
Commission, is a new type of optical electronic seal that aims to combine the simplicity of a passive
seal with the core advantages of electronic seals. It provides a continuous monitoring of the optical
fiber wire and simplifies the inspector’s work. The AOLS is the first active seal with an open hardware
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and software architecture. This allows the inspectorates to more thoroughly assess its security and
change functions to meet the wide range of containment requirements [22].
Concerning copper canisters identification, physical seals cannot be applied if the seal risks
compromising the long-term safety performance of the canister following its emplacement in the
repository. Seals could be used as a potential C/S measure for transportation of spent fuel. In fact,
seals could be applied on transport casks for copper canisters assuring CoK of spent fuel during
transport and shipment between the encapsulation plant and the repository site. In this case, the
identification tags on the canisters could be much simpler, since the container seal ensures that the tags
could not have been altered. However it depends on how CoK would be applied from the higher-level
systems perspective.
4. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
Comprehensive monitoring and tracking of sensitive nuclear materials can be achieved with
radio frequency identification (RFID) techniques. These systems not only monitor the condition of
the nuclear materials, but also track environmental and physical changes to the packages, sending
real-time alerts during storage and transportation. A RFID system generally consists of tags and
readers (Figure 7). The tags are attached to the objects to be identified.
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Nanoparticle Aggregates) provides a unique identifier or signature for tagging applications. SANAs 
are formed from gold or silver nanoparticles in the 40–80 nm size range. A chemical ‘dye’ is attached 
to the nanoparticle surface and the nanoparticles are aggregated into ensembles. The dye provides 
individual identifying information to the aggregate, which is finally coated in a glass layer to 
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surface-mounted to tag or seal materials. Upon excitation by a laser (Figure 9), a SANA returns a 
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RFID can be active and passive. Active tags contain a small internal power source to communicate,
store and process large amounts of information in the chip. A power source is usually a lithium battery
lasting less than 5 years. This makes them unsuitable for use in long-term storages. Passive tags have
no battery. In order to provide power and data to the chip, they use the current in the loop antenna
which is induced by the interrogating RF signal. Thus, they receive power from the reader’s antenna.
The reader can be installed inside a truck trailer or storage facility and communicates with the tags
through radio waves (UHF, 433.9 MHz, range of transmission up to≈100 m). When the tag, containing
several resonant circuits, enters a detection zone, the system determines the resonant frequency of
each of the resonant circuits and produces a corresponding code. The system tracks the tagged objects
and queries their state of health autonomously and continuously [23].
This monitoring system (Figure 8) is then advantageous in terms of streamlined operation,
improved record-keeping, enhanced safety, security and safeguards, cost savings [24]. However, many
of the sensitive nuclear materials under surveillance are emitters of neutron and gamma radiation that
can impede RFID working correctly.
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The implementation of RFID systems for copper canisters identification could be precluded by
handling realities. In fact an exterior affixed tag may be vulnerable to damage during handling.
However, a tag on the inside of a canister would not be similarly affected. As a consequence, an
interior tag would not be as easily subject to intentional tampering. It would have to survive a harsh
environment, certainly that from radiation, and would also need to be able to be verified from outside
the canister through the thick copper wall (which is not feasible). As a result, RFID tags cannot be used
due to copper shielding, but a magnetic-based technology for tagging may be possible.
5. SERS-Active Nanoparticle Aggregates
The Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering (SERS) response from SANAs (SERS-Active Nanoparticle
Aggregates) provides a unique identifier or signature for tagging applications. SANAs are formed from
gold or silver nanoparticles in the 40–80 nm size range. A chemical ‘dye’ is attached to the nanoparticle
surface and the nanoparticles are aggregated into ensembles. The dye provides individual identifying
information to the aggregate, which is finally coated in a glass layer to provide environmental stability.
The completed SANA can be physically embedded in or chemically surface-mounted to tag or seal
materials. Upon excitation by a laser (Figure 9), a SANA returns a spectroscopic signal unique to the
dye, or combination of dyes, absorbed by the SANA metal surface. Depending on the application, the
signal can be reduced to a simple barcode, or examined in complex detail to provide a high security
signature that is cost prohibitive to replicate.
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Figure 9. Laser excitation of SANAs to provide a spectroscopic barcode.
SANA-based tags incorporate the fundamental advantages of most passive tagging and sealing
technologies. The system will be inexpensive due to low material costs for the tags, and shared
verification hardware. No on-site power sources or infrastructure will be required. No RF, Wi-Fi,
or other networking technologies will be required. The SANAs signature can be extensively varied
to provide a library of unique tag systems. However the apparent weakness in this approach is the
possibility that the identity of the chemical dye could be determined, leading to the direct preparation
of a counterfeit batch of SANAs. Moreover silver and gold nanoparticles are known to suffer structural
degradation over long periods, or during adverse environmental exposure, then a silica (or glass)
coating should be applied to improve the stability of the fingerprint. In order to increase the tag
security, SANAs could be integrated with Reflective Particle Tags (RPT) realizing a highly secure,
tamper evident and traceable passive tagging system [25].
The use of SERS-Active Nanoparticle Aggregates for copper canisters identification requires
the application of a tag or a seal on the surface of the container. As already discussed for the RFID
technology, the presence of an exterior tag could be a problem during handling. However if the
tag only needs to last until final emplacement, then an affixed tag could be used, and removed if
necessary at emplacement. Moreover, SERS-Active Nanoparticle Aggregates tags cannot be placed
inside canisters because the laser used for the reading of the fingerprint cannot penetrate through the
50 mm of copper thickness due to the high attenuation.
Sensors 2018, 18, 929 10 of 17
6. Reflective Particle Tags (RPT)
The Reflective Particle Tag (RPT) is a next generation of tag technology developed with the goal
of providing both a unique identifier and visual evidence of tampering. They are resin tags infused
with reflective crystals that are placed over sensitive seals. The goal is developing a verification routine
based on image processing that verifies the original set of images of an RPT, against a set taken at a
later time. Each set contains images taken by illuminating the RPT from a number of orientations,
creating different views due to crystal reflections.
The tag (Figure 10) consists of reflective particles mixed in a transparent adhesive matrix, which
is applied to the surface of the item to be identified and then cured. A reader consisting of a number of
lights and some means of recording an image is used to read the patterns formed by the reflectors in
the tag. Comparing images of the tag to images taken when the tag was applied verifies the identity of
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canisters for spent nuclear fuel. This method envisages the realization of a series of holes on a 
tungsten plate, reproducing a unique binary code. The tungsten insert is located inside copper 
canisters, between the top iron lid and the copper lid. The configuration of holes is machined in 
correspondence of the spent fuel assemblies in order to detect the gamma rays. Because of the strong 
collimation of gamma rays due to tungsten attenuation features, the unique code realized on the 
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Figure 10. Reflective particles tag on a COBRA seal.
The RPT architecture has proven resistant to counterfeiting and removal without detection.
Furthermore, the tag requires no power, and is stable through temperature extremes, rough handling,
and years of service. Concerning copper canisters identification, if affixed tags could be used,
the reflective particle tag (RPT) may be a possible option. However locating RPT and SANAs tags
inside the canister is not very easy. Furthermore, the reader system suffers from image degeneration
and irregular calibrations. Moreover if the RPT tag is installed on a seal placed on the surface of
a canister, it could trigger a corrosion process, undercutting the long term stability of the canister
structure [27].
7. Reflective Laser Scanning
During transportation and storage of nuclear items, their location and security can be verified
by a low power laser scanning system and retro-reflective material used as tags. An identification
tag comprises a retroreflective substrate for reflecting incident light beams, and patterned indicia for
selectively reducing retro reflectivity of the retroreflective substrate. The unique identity is due to the
presence of a non-reflective material on the retroreflective surface of the tag. Tags affixed to the items
can be monitored from a fixed observation point by a laser scanning system having a rotating mirror
with ultra-precise angular resolution (Figure 11). If a tag is missing or it has moved, the system detects
this change.
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Considering a potential application of this system for copper canisters identification, the same set
of problems observed for RFID systems can be found. Unlike RFID, this method of information transfer
is virtually impossible to intercept or falsify [28]. However tags could be removed and reattached or
even duplicated, without alerting the system. In order to avoid any risks of failure, having redundancy
could be effective but also expensive in terms of costs and resources. Moreover reflective laser scanning
is most useful for long term static storage and not for monitoring during transport of canisters. Indeed
the application of tags on the external surface could be a problem during handling of canisters.
8. Tungsten-Based Identifier
The Tungsten-based identifier has been specifically developed for the identification of copper
canisters for spent nuclear fuel. This method envisages the realization of a series of holes on a tungsten
plate, reproducing a unique binary code. The tungsten insert is located inside copper canisters,
between the top iron lid and the copper lid. The configuration of holes is machined in correspondence
of the spent fuel assemblies in order to detect the gamma rays. Because of the strong collimation of
gamma rays due to tungsten attenuation features, the unique code realized on the tungsten plate
can be acquired by a gamma rays detector placed above the copper lid. In particular, the change of
the gamma-counting rate in the reader gives evidence of the holes’ disposition and then the unique
fingerprint. More than a binary code can be realized on the plate to guarantee redundancy and an
ultrasonic transducer can be used to confirm the location of holes on the plate (Figure 12). Depending
on the source of gamma rays, this approach can involve passive tags (intrinsic source) or active tags
(artificial source).
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In case of counterfeit of canisters, their disposition can be easily duplicated and ultrasonic 
inspections cannot reveal any change. Therefore the investigation of the welding area between lid 
and canister could be useful to assess the authenticity of the container. In particular, ultrasounds can 
be used to acquire the fingerprint related to the variation of the internal gap between lid and tube 
after FSW (Figure 14). The ultrasonic amplitude response acquired with an ultrasonic probe at  
10 MHz of frequency could be used as a unique signature for each canister [33]. First experimental 
tests carried out on copper lid already welded onto canisters showed the presence of several points 
Figure 12. Set-up of the Tungsten-based identifier.
The active tag is realized by α-emitting isotopes with a high energy that create a unique pattern,
avoiding non-uniformities of the radiation background. Nevertheless, this type of tags is difficult to
implement in the real case. In fact, the presence of radioisotopes implies the installation of a devoted
laboratory at the encapsulation plant and increase the radioactivity level of copper canisters. On the
contrary, the practical implementation of passive tags is more realistic because they need only the
radiation of the spent fuel.
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This way of identification of the copper cask does not impair the integrity of the cask and it offers
a way for the information about the spent nuclear fuel to be read up to a few thousand years. Moreover,
differently from the other technologies that involve tags attached on the surface, this method avoids
any problems related to canisters handling. Nevertheless, the tag is artificially prepared and then it
could be reproduced. The only aspect that can contribute to define this solution secure is the high cost
of replication. [29,30]. In addition, the use of ultrasounds to reveal discontinuities in the tungsten layer
is critical due to the coupling between the copper lid and the tungsten plate.
9. Ultrasonic Systems
The identification of copper canisters could be realized by the ultrasonic acquisition of a double
fingerprint: artificial and natural [31]. The first signature is created by milling a series of chamfers
on the inner surface of the copper lid before closure onto the canister by Friction Stir Welding (FSW).
Chamfers are arranged around the lid circumference, in an area (yellow circle in Figure 13) where
the copper thickness is higher than 50 mm, which is the minimum thickness to fulfill mechanical
design requirements. The investigation of chamfers is accomplished by an ultrasonic transducer that
rotates 360◦ around the circumference with an inclination according to the Snell’s law. The ultrasonic
amplitude response acquired by the probe, represents a unique binary code, strictly related to chamfers
configuration [32]. The machining of chamfers on the lid guarantees a long term fingerprint for copper
canisters and can be easily included within the machining process of the lid during the production
of canisters.
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Figure 13. The ultrasonic investigation of chamfers, artificially machined on canisters’ lid to create a
unique identification fingerprint.
In case of counterfeit of canisters, their disposition can be easily duplicated and ultrasonic
inspections cannot reveal any change. Therefore the investigation of the welding area between lid
and canister could be useful to assess the authenticity of the container. In particular, ultrasounds
can be used to acquire the fingerprint related to the variation of the internal gap between lid and
tube after FSW (Figure 14). The ultrasonic amplitude response acquired with an ultrasonic probe at
10 MHz of frequency could be used as a unique signature for each canister [33]. First experimental
tests carried out on copper lid already welded onto canisters showed the presence of several points
of interest in the fingerprint that could be used for the authentication of each canister. Therefore the
identification of copper canisters could be ensured by an artificial fingerprint created by chamfers and
the authentication by a natural fingerprint due the welding area. The angular matching of these two
signatures, realize a third fingerprint, more robust and reliable.
Differently to all the other tagging methods, the ultrasonic approach is the only one which cannot
be reproduced because is based on a natural fingerprint. In fact, the structure of the material during the
welding process could be altered in a random way and a high frequency inspection by ultrasound can
reveal it. Moreover the ultrasonic amplitude response is strictly related to the attenuation properties of
copper whose grain structure could vary a lot creating different patterns for each canister.
Sensors 2018, 18, 929 13 of 17
Sensors 2018, 18, x FOR PEER REVIEW  12 of 17 
 
of interest in the fingerprint that could be used for the authentication of each canister. Therefore the 
identification of copper canisters could be ensured by an artificial fingerprint created by chamfers 
and the authentication by a natural fingerprint due the welding area. The angular matching of these 
two signatures, realize a third fingerprint, more robust and reliable.  
  
Figure 13. The ultrasonic investigation of chamfers, artificially machined on canisters’ lid to create a 
unique identification fingerprint. 
 
Figure 14. Ultrasonic investigation of the internal gap between lid and canister after friction stir 
welding. 
Differently to all the other tagging methods, the ultrasonic approach is the only one which 
cannot be reproduced because is based on a natural fingerprint. In fact, the structure of the material 
during the welding process could be altered in a random way and a high frequency inspection by 
ultrasound can reveal it. Moreover the ultrasonic amplitude response is strictly related to the 
attenuation properties of copper whose grain structure could vary a lot creating different patterns 
for each canister.  
10. Comparison between Tagging Technologies  
Following the description of the most common tagging technologies for nuclear items, their 
potential implementation for copper canisters identification and authentication is discussed in this 
chapter. Table 1 shows if each technology meets or not all the requirements illustrated in Chapter 2. 
Based on the list of requirements and the results obtained, a comparison between tagging systems 
can be done: 
 Large and unique tag memory: all the tags respect the requirement. This specification is at the base 
of the definition of a tagging system and then it is necessary but not sufficient. The labelling 
system should enable fully unique identification of the canister content in a manner consistent 
with permanent records of the storage or repository. 
 Security against falsification of data: this requirement, in addition with the previous, is of upmost 
importance for copper canisters. It implies a strong reliability of the tagging system, as well as a 
strong immunity to falsification or error. No technology satisfies this specification, except 
ultrasonic reading of welding/grain “anomalies”. In fact, the fingerprint of the welding area is 
strictly related to material/welding properties, typical of each container and then not 
reproducible. 
Figure 14. Ultrasonic investigation of the internal gap between lid and canister after friction
stir welding.
10. Comparison between Tagging Technologies
Following the description of the most commo tagging technologies for nuclear items, their
potential implem ntation for copp canisters identification and authentication is discusse in this
chapter. Table 1 shows if each technology meets or not all the requirements illustrated in Ch pt r 2.
Bas d on the list of requirements and the results obtained, a comparison between tagging systems can
be done:
• Large and unique tag memory: all the tags respect the requirement. This specification is at the base
of the definition of a tagging system and then it is necessary but not sufficient. The labelling
syste should enable fully unique identification of the canister content in a manner consistent
with permanent records of the storage or repository.
• Security against falsification of data: this requirement, in addition with the previous, is of upmost
importance for copper canisters. It implies a strong reliability of the tagging system, as well
as a strong immunity to falsification or error. No technology satisfies this specification, except
ultrasonic reading of welding/grain “anomalies”. In fact, the fingerprint of the welding area is
strictly related to material/welding properties, typical of each container and then not reproducible.
• Environmental safety: only the Tungsten-based identifier and ultrasounds could avoid problems
with copper corrosion. I fact he labelling system should avoid corrosion effects of canisters
which can be induced in the long-ter run, thus for inst nce avoiding leaka e of spent fuel w te
components later on. For these reasons, the application f all the technologies which imply the
se of seals on the canister cannot be consider d.
• Non-contact rea er system: each tag could impl m nt a non-contact reader. This minor requiremen
aims to pres rve the copper canister external surface and above all to protect the reader from the
high radiation level of spent fuel.
• Long operation time: the operating time should be at least to the end of the deposition of the last
canister which is estimated to last 30 years. As a consequence, Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID), SERS-Active Nanoparticle Aggregates and Reflective Particle Tags (RPT) do not satisfy this
requirement. RFID systems have an operation time less than 7 years related to the interference of
the metallization layer with RF signal. The other two tags, instead, suffer from image degradation
over time.
• Resistance to harsh environment: the presence of a high radiation level could compromise the mode
of operation of the tagging system. Moreover the presence of high temperatures could affect
the electronics of reader devices or reduce the accuracy of measures. There are no experimental
results available on the impact of a harsh environment on the effectiveness and longevity of
tagging systems. Therefore from this review the authors envisaged that future studies must be
carried out to verify the resistance of each technology.
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Table 1. List of existing tagging technologies that fulfill or not the requirements for copper canisters identification.
Requirements
Existing Tagging Technologies
Seals Radio FrequencyIdentification (RFID)
SERS-Active
Nanoparticle Aggregates
Reflective Particle
Tags (RPT)
Reflective Laser
Scanning
Tungsten-Based
Identifier
Ultrasonic
Systems
Large and unique tag memory Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Security against falsification of data Yes No No No No No Yes
Environmental safety No No No No No Yes Yes
Non-contact reader system Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Long operation time Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
Resistance to harsh environment Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
Cost-effectiveness Yes Yes No No No No Yes
Easy implementation and use No No No No No Yes Yes
Minimal human input Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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• Cost-effectiveness: the cost is not a relevant parameter for the Safeguards of spent fuel. However
certain technologies, such as SERS-Active Nanoparticle Aggregates, Reflective Particle Tags (RPT),
Reflective laser scanning and Tungsten-based identifier have a high cost for duplication which is
deterrent for duplication.
• Easy implementation and use: the implementation of all the tagging systems is not very easy because
most of them require the presence of a seal or an adhesive tag at least, which makes difficult the
handling of canisters.
• Minimal human input: all the reading of tags could be potentially automated and then would not
require any human input once applied on canisters. Data could be acquired by the system, saved
and transferred remotely to the inspectorates’ headquarters.
11. Conclusions
In order to keep the Continuity of Knowledge of spent nuclear fuel and guarantee a sufficient
level of security against misuse or counterfeiting of copper canisters, a robust identification and
authentication technology must be implemented. Following the analysis of Safeguards requirements
for geological repositories and copper canisters in detail, an overview of existing tagging technologies
is reported in the previous chapters. In order to better identify which technique could be the most
suitable for copper canisters identification and authentication, a comparison between technologies
is accomplished. A table is fulfilled to better visualize if requirements were satisfied or not by each
tagging system. In conclusion, the introduction of copper canisters for long term geological repositories
has brought the necessity to develop new tagging methods based on modern technologies in the field of
electronics, optics or computer science. As a result of this study, only the Tungsten-based method and
ultrasounds could satisfy the desire to avoid any introduction of additional or unforeseen corrosion
effects on the copper canisters. However, the ultrasonic system better meets all the requirements,
especially regarding the ability to authenticate containers. In fact, all the tagging systems analyzed are
based on a tag artificially created, while the fingerprint due to the welding area is a natural fingerprint,
related to the material structure of each copper canister, which can’t be reproduced.
12. Patents
F. Littmann, “Ultrasonic identification and authentication of containers for hazardous materials”,
European Patent 16,166,465, 21 April 2016.
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